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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
Section 30-3-10 
(1) . . . In determining custody, the Court shall 
consider the best interest of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties. 
(2) In awarding custody, the Court shall consider, 
among other factors the Court finds relevant, 
which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interest of the child, including allowing the 
child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the Court finds appropriate. 
Section 30-3-5(2) 
The Court may include, in an Order determining child 
support, an Order assigning financial responsibility for 
all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on 
behalf of the dependant children. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-903 - Uniform Custody Evaluations 
(2) In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the 
evaluation on both parties and shall submit a 
written report to the Court, . . . 
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to each of 
the following factors: 
A. The child's preference; 
B. The benefit of keeping siblings together; 
C. The relative strength of the child's bond 
with one or both of the perspective custodians; 
D. The general interest in continuing previously 
determined custody arrangements where the 
child is happy and well adjusted; 
E. Factors relating to the perspective custodian's 
character status or their capacity or willingness 
to function as parents, including: 
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(i) Moral character and emotional stability; 
(ii) Duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(iii) Ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; 
(iv) Significant impairment of ability to 
function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking or other causes; 
(v) Reasons for having relinquished custody 
in the past; 
(vi) Religious compatability with the child; 
(vii) Kinship; 
(viii) Financial condition. 
F. Any other factors deemed important by the 
evaluator, the parties or the Court. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND AUTHORITY 
1. The trial court must consider that "a child custody 
proceeding is equitable in nature and must be based primarily and 
foremost on the welfare and interest of the minor children. The 
Court must, in the custody dispute, give the highest priority to 
the welfare of the children over the desires of either parent. 
Awarding custody and visitation rights are within Trial Court's 
discretion and will be reversed upon abuse of that discretion." 
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Otah 1980); Dana v. Dana, 789 
P.2d 729 (Utah App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 786 P.2d 465 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
2. The factors the trial court should consider in 
determining the best interest of the child in a custody dispute 
are the need for stability in custodial relationship in 
environment; maintaining an existing primary custodial bond; the 
relative strength of the parental bonds; the relative abilities 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the parent to provide care, supervision and a suitable 
environment for the children and to meet the needs of the 
children; preference of a child able to evaluate the custody 
question; the benefits of keeping siblings together and enabling 
sibling bonds to perform; character and emotional stability of 
the custodian; the desire for custody; the apparent commitment of 
the proposed custodian to parent. Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 
(Utah App. 1990). 
3. The identity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage, the parent with whom the child has spent most of his or 
her time, is prominent as a factor for determining custody. Moon 
v. Moon, (supra). 
4. Another main factor that the trial court must consider 
is whether the custodial parent (including the parent with 
temporary custody) allows the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the non-custodial parent. Utah Code Annotated, 
§30-3-10(2); Chase v. Chase, 387 P.2d 556 (Utah 1963). 
5. The trial court may consider a recommendation from an 
independent custody evaluator but said recommendations are 
advisory only and in no sense controlling. Mecham v. Mecham, 544 
P.2d 479 (Utah 1975). 
6. The trial court should not limit overnight visitation 
when the noncustodial parent has previously had the minor child 
on a continual basis, including overnight, during the preceeding 
5 
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18 months. Moon v. Moon, supra; Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 973, 
974 (Utah App. 1989). 
7. The court abused its discretion in.failing to enter 
sufficient findings setting forth any special and unusual 
circumstances that would justify the restricted visitation 
awarded to the plaintiff which was punitive in that it awarded 
plaintiff considerably less visitation time with the minor child 
than defendant was entitled to exercise during the pendency of 
the proceedings which by defendant's own testimony exceeded eight 
days during each month. See Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 
(Utah 1978). 
8. Over emphasis of one factor by the trial court in 
consideration of a custody award is abuse of discretion. See 
Move v. Move, 102 Idaho 170, 627 P.2d 799 (1981). 
9. It is essential that the trial court acts within its 
broad discretion that a basis for a determination of custody and 
award of visitation be articulated in clear factual findings. 
Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436 (Utah App. 1989). 
10. It is an abuse of discretion to have given greater 
weight to the recommendation of Dr. Stewart than other evidence 
presented at the trial when said recommendation is based on 
speculation. Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P.2d 479 (Utah 1975); Walker 
v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah App. 1985); 
11. A finding of fact cannot be based on mere speculation. 
Orson v. Warwood, 255 P.2d 725, 123 Utah 111; Fitzgerald v. 
Fitzgerald, 369 P.2d 398, (N.M. 1962). 
6 
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12. Substantial evidence is that of sufficient quantum and 
quality to persuade a responsible mind of the truth of a declared 
premise. First National v. County Board, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 
1990); Nejin v. City of Seattle, 698 P.2d 615 (Wash. App. 1985). 
13. It is an abuse of discretion when the distribution of 
the debts by the trial court is unequitable, based upon the 
parties1 financial circumstances. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331 (Utah App. 1988); Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1194 (Utah App. 
1984). 
STATEMENT OP CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from a Decree of Divorce and Order Denying Motion 
for New Trial entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Complaint was filed by the plaintiff on the 5th day of 
November, 1990 (R. 2-6), and the defendant filed a Complaint on 
the 30th of January, 1991 (Civil Number 914900025) and said two 
actions were consolidated by Order of the Court on the 8th of 
February, 1991 (R. 12-15) as D-90-4449 and the Complaint in the 
later action filed was treated as a Counterclaim. Plaintiff was 
granted temporary custody of the minor child and defendant was 
given visitation (R.61, 83-85) which was subsequently changed to 
two days per week. 
7 
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C. DISPOSITION 
The trial was commenced May 28, 1992 and concluded June 2, 
1992 at which time the Court announced its ruling and decision. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
prepared by defendant's counsel were signed by the Court on the 
5th day of July, 1992 (R. 169-185) which Decree awarded defendant 
custody of the minor child, plaintiff restricted visitation 
rights, ordering plaintiff to pay child support, ordering the 
defendant to pay one-half of the fee to Dr. Stewart and denying 
plaintiff's request for reimbursement for child care expenses 
incurred. The Court denied the Motion for a New Trial and 
Objections to Findings of Fact on September 8, 1992 (R. 221-223). 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married March 9, 1990 in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The parties separated three 
months later on the 9th of June, 1990. The minor child, Paige, 
was born approximately six months later on December 18, 1990 and 
continued from birth until the time of the trial in this matter 
in the continuous care, custody and control of the plaintiff who 
was the primary caretaker of said minor child for the first 18 
months of her life (Vol. I, T. 4-5, Addendum "A", page 5, f 11. 
8 
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2. Plaintiff also had custody of a minor child, Brandi, 
from another marriage, age 4 1/2, who resided with the plaintiff 
and the minor child, Paige, during the entire first 18 months of 
said minor child, Paige's life. Brandi had a very close 
relationship with Paige (Vol. I, T. 27-29). 
3. Plaintiff filed for divorce on November 5, 1990 on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences alleging that the defendant 
was moralistic and rigid in his religious beliefs and talked 
about Satan alot (Vol. I, T. 5). 
4. From the minor child's birth on the 18th of December, 
1990, until the trial in this matter on the 2nd of June, 1992, 
the plaintiff freely cooperated in granting to the defendant more 
than reasonable visitation with the minor child of which 
consisted of at least eight days per month (Vol. I, T. 7-8). 
5. The plaintiff was awarded the temporary custody of 
the minor child, Paige, after a hearing before Commissioner 
Allphin on the 22nd day of January, 1992 (R. 12-15) 
6. The parties' attorneys jointly stipulated to the 
appointment of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart to do a custody evaluation 
(R. 36). Dr. Stewart conducted interviews with the defendant and 
a short phone conversation with defendant's mother. Dr. Stewart 
met with the plaintiff on approximately five occasions for a 
total of only 4-5 hours. Further, Dr. Stewart interviewed 
9 
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plaintiff's mother, father and step-mother, the child's 
pediatrician and the day care provider and observed the minor 
child in the presence of both parents and one time with her 
sister, Brandi (Vol. I, T. 103-104; Vol. Ill, T. 51-58). 
When Dr. Stewart tested the parties she failed to conduct any 
tests whatsoever on the sister, Brandi (Vol. I, T. 136). 
7. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart performed an incomplete and 
inadequate custody evaluation and charged $3,000 for the same and 
submitted the report which was admitted into evidence. 
A. Dr. Stewart only saw the minor child with each of the 
parents on one occasion each on October of 1991 (Vol. I, T. 
103-104). 
B. The minor child, Paige, was only ten months old when 
Dr. Stewart observed her. Dr. Stewart failed to conduct any 
update observations or evaluation for the approximately 
six-seven month period prior to the trial in this matter. 
Further, Dr. Stewart made no home visits and did not contact 
any other collateral parties. Dr. Stewart only gave two tests, 
the MMPI and Rotter sentence exam (Vol. I, T. 103). 
C. Plaintiff felt that Dr. Stewart was prejudiced against 
her and did not hear what she was told or pay attention to 
important details given to her (Vol. Ill, T. 20-21). 
D. Dr. Stewart failed to interview the minor child, 
Brandi, individually, or give her any tests (Vol. Ill, T. 57-59). 
10 
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E. Dr. Stewart had a negative and somewhat prejudicial 
opinion of plaintiff's mother and failed to give her any tests 
whatsoever but was concerned about her mother's attitude toward 
fathers and men (Vol. I, T. 117, 118 and 109). 
P. Dr. Stewart's main basis for recommending the 
defendant being awarded custody was based on Dr. Stewart's 
speculative opinion that the plaintiff developed attitudes and 
values towards fathers from her own dysfunctional family 
structure that might affect the minor child, Paige, in the 
future. Dr. Stewart also speculated that in the future the 
defendant would teach the child to get along with others and to 
learn solid values better than the plaintiff (Addendum "A", Vol. 
I, T. 109, 120-121). 
G. However, Dr. Stewart concluded that the plaintiff was: 
(1) the primary caretaker of the minor child, Paige; 
(2) that the minor child, Paige, was alert, 
good-natured, responsive and quite outgoing; 
(3) that the minor child, Brandi, .had a big sister 
relationship with Paige, 
(4) that the minor child, Brandi, was not a problem 
child and did not need to be tested; 
(5) that the minor child, Paige, is very closely 
bonded to the plaintiff; 
(6) that plaintiff's moral behavior was on par with 
the defendant; 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(7) that the plaintiff's desire for custody of the 
minor child was on par with the defendant; 
(8) that each party would have to obtain surrogate 
care; 
(9) that neither party had an problems with drugs 
or drinking; 
(10) that the factor of kindred or grandparents 
was about the same; 
(11) that the plaintiff had done a good job as 
a mother; 
(12) that plaintiff was capable of raising the 
minor child, Paige, and had a desire to 
raise said child; 
(13) that the plaintiff balanced her work and 
family well and had been successful as a 
mother; 
(14) that plaintiff was very loving and attached 
to her children; 
(15) that plaintiff made friends easily and was 
outgoing (Vol. I, T. 5-47) 
(16) Dr. Stewart recommended restricted visitation 
but stated no basis for the same (Vol. I, T. 
137, Addendum "A"). 
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8. Dr. Paula Swaner, a Clinical Psychologist, was called 
as a witness for the plaintiff. Dr. Swaner had spent two years 
meeting with the plaintiff as her therapist spending 
approximately thirty hours with the plaintiff (Vol. Ill, T. 
15-20). 
A. Dr. Swaner testified that the plaintiff was not 
impulsive or volatile and had a positive attitude toward men and 
fathers (Vol. Ill, T. 23, 28). 
B. Dr. Swaner found the defendant, after meeting with him 
on two occasions, to have suffered from a narcissistic injury 
when he was lashing out at the plaintiff and threatened to take 
the minor child from the plaintiff since the time the plaintiff 
was three months pregnant (Vol. Ill, T. 18, 19 and 23). 
C. That it was of primary importance to keep Paige and 
Brandi together and that Dr. Stewart's restricted visitation 
schedule would not allow enough time for Brandi and Paige to 
maintain their relationship (Vol. Ill, T. 26). 
D. That it would be a traumatic experience for the minor 
child, Paige, to change the custodial environment at the minor 
child's development stage of approximately 13 to 20 months and it 
would be best for the child to remain with the primary caretaker 
(Vol. Ill, T. 27). 
E. That plaintiff's custodial environment as primary 
caretaker met all of the necessary needs of the minor child, 
Paige, (Vol. Ill, T. 40-41). 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
F. That Dr. Swaner did not agree with Dr. Stewart's 
recommendation and felt that the custody arrangement should not 
be changed based upon plaintiff being the primary caretaker and 
that any change at this time in the child's life would be 
traumatic and adverse to her best interests (Vol. Ill, T. 21-28). 
9. That Dr. Johanna McManemin, a Clinical Psychologist, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff. Dr. McManeimin performed 
an evaluation on Brandi and reviewed Dr. Stewart's report, the 
MMPI results and the raw data and notes of Dr. Stewart. Dr. 
McManeimin did not agree with Dr. Stewart's recommendation 
either (Vol. Ill, T. 51-52). 
A. Dr. McManemin believed that Dr. Stewart's statement 
that the defendant was more emotionally stable than the plaintiff 
was based upon speculation since there was very little 
information on Mr. Evans and the test information was 
approximately the same for both parties (Vol. Ill, T. 54-55). 
B. That it was extremely important to keep Paige and 
Brandi together and that changing the custody would be traumatic 
for Paige due to the fact that it was critical for her to stay 
with the primary caretaker (Vol. Ill, T. 55-57). 
C. That Dr. Stewart did not spend any individual time 
with Brandi or test Brandi. Further, that Brandi was an 
exceptionally bright and well-adjusted child, played well with 
Paige and had a good relationship and bond with Paige. Further, 
14 
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Brandi had a good relationship with her father. More importantly 
was the fact that Brandi was not a beneficiary of any negative 
attitude toward fathers or men which would be the best evidence 
of the plaintiff's custodial environment for Paige as compared to 
the speculation used by Dr. Stewart. Further, that looking at the 
personality and characteristics of Brandi was a good indication 
as to the plaintifffs parenting and good evidence as to what kind 
of child Paige would be at the same age or thereafter (Vol. Ill, 
T. 57-62). 
10. Myra Brodale, the daycare provider was called as a 
witness for the plaintiff and testified that both Paige and 
Brandi were in her day care from February 1992 through the time 
of the trial and that Brandi had been in the day care for 
approximately two years and was a "model child and very well 
adjusted" (Vol. II, T. 22-24). 
11. Each party testified for themselves and called 
additional witnesses that were biased toward the party that 
called the same. 
12. Plaintiff was employed with a gross monthly income of 
approximately $1,456.00 and the defendant was employed with a 
gross monthly income of approximately $2,400.00 (Vol. I, T. 46). 
13. The plaintiff incurred daycare expenses of 
approximately $1,100.00 for and in behalf of the minor child, 
Paige (Vol. I, T. 41-43). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The minor child, Paige, was a happy, healthy and 
well-adjusted child who had been in the exclusive care, custody 
and control of the plaintiff for the first 18 months of said 
childfs life. Said child had a stable environment and a close 
bond to her mother, the plaintiff, and to her half-sister, 
Brandi. The Court's determination of the change of custody based 
upon speculation as to what might happen in the future as 
compared to the child's stability and, further, disregarding the 
potential trauma of a change of custody was, in fact, an abuse of 
discretion by the Court. 
2. The Court gave undue emphasis and weight to Dr. 
Stewart's evaluation and recommendation and her concern as to 
what might happen in the future based upon the plaintiff and 
plaintiff's mother's attitude toward men. The Court did not 
fully consider and give weight to all of the necessary factors in 
determining custody which weighed heavily in favor of the 
plaintiff. Further, the Court made findings based upon 
speculation and not substantial evidence in determining the award 
of custody. All of the above was an abuse of discretion. 
3. The Court knew that the defendant, during the first 18 
months of the child's life, had more than reasonable visitation 
with said minor child of approximately two days per week. 
However, when the Court changed custody it restricted the 
16 
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visitation of the plaintiff to less than what the defendant had 
during the pendency of the matter. Based upon the circumstances 
of this case where the plaintiff had been the sole primary 
caretaker of the minor child for the first 18 months of her life, 
it was an abuse of discretion and error for the Court to restrict 
plaintiff's visitation rights to now allow any overnight 
visitation. It was also a total disregard of what would be in 
the best interests of the minor child. Further, there was not 
sufficient findings of fact to support said restricted 
visitation. 
4. There is also a lack of findings in regards to the 
Order of the Court for the plaintiff to pay one-half of the 
evaluation to Dr. Stewart. Said Order was not fair and equitable 
and an abuse of discretion. 
5. The Court incorrectly reviewed the evidence and failed 
to award the plaintiff her incurred day care expenses when, in 
fact, she was entitled to the same. 
17 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A child's need for stability is a fundamental 
consideration in custody awards in determination of a child's 
best interest. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 ( Ut. Ct. App. 
1989). The Trial Court failed to fully consider stability and 
continuity and the potential trauma in Paige's life by changing 
the custodial environment. The Court in its ruling (Addendum 
"B") appeared to just basically read from the report of Dr. 
Stewart in regards to the child's need for stability and 
preventing a traumatic experience rather than expressing a 
finding based on all the evidence. For example the Court failed 
to consider that after one year of the plaintiff being the sole 
primary caretaker, the minor child, Paige, was alert, responsive, 
good-natured, passing developmental milestones in a normal 
fashion, very affectionate, responsive to people adn quite 
outgoing and presented no problems whatsoever to either parent 
(Addendum "C", Observations of Paige Evans. 
Further, the minor child, Brandi, age 4 1/2, as observed 
by the day care provider, Myra Brodale, and Dr. McManemin, was 
also a well-behgaved, well-adjusted, bright, model child (Vol. 
II, T. 24-29) who was closely bonded to Paige and played 
extremely well with her (Vol. II, T. 24, Vol. Ill, T. 58-59). 
These observations were made just prior to trial and 8-9 months 
after Dr. Stewart's observations. 
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Another part of the evidence the Court didn't consider was 
the potential trauma to Paige in June 1992 by transferring the 
custody. At that time there was still a close, emotional bond 
between Paige and the plaintiff as well as an increased bonding 
with the sister, Brandi. The Court based its finding of no 
potential trauma on statements of Dr. Stewart about the child in 
October of 1991 and not what the circumstances were in May and 
June of 1992. Dr. McManemin tested, interviewed and evaluated 
the minor child, Brandi, in May of 1992, just a couple weeks 
prior to the trial. She also interviewed and observed Brandi at 
that time with the minor child, Paige. Dr. McManemin 
specifically indicated that it would be traumatic to change the 
custody arrangement for Paige due to the fact that she was now 
between the 18 month and two year stage which was critical in a 
child's development. Dr. McManemin stated it would be 
traumatic at this time to remove Paige from her primary caretaker 
and from Brandi. Dr. Steward never addressed this issue since 
her evaluation was done eight or nine months previous (Vol. Ill, 
T. 56-57). 
Further, Dr. McManemin observed that Dr. Stewart did not 
spend any individual time with Brandi and did not seem much 
concerned with the relationship between Paige and Brandi (Vol. 
Ill, T. 57-58). Again, the Court relied upon Dr. Stewart's 
evaluation that was done many months prior to the Trial as 
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compared with Myra Brodale and Dr. McManemin!s observations and 
evalution as to the stability and relationship between the two 
minor children that was done a week or so prior to the trial. 
Dr. McManemin specifically observed the two minor children 
playing together a week prior to the trial and indicated that 
there was a very strong bond between the two girls and that 
Brandi was protective of Paige and enjoyed being with her and 
that Paige was bonded very closely to Brandi (Vol. Ill, T. 59). 
Dr. McManemin said that the change in custodial arrangement in 
June 1992 would be extremely traumatic for Paige, not only by 
being taken away from her primary caretaker, the mother, but also 
from her relationship with Brandi. Also, Dr. McManemin was 
adamant that Paige and Brandi be kept together since they are 
close enough in age that there would be a long term bond and it 
would be traumatic for Paige to be separated from her sister as 
well as her mother (Vol. Ill, T. 56-57). 
It is now apparent that Dr. Stewart's speculation as to 
the trauma Paige would not experience by the change of custody 
and the Court's blind reliance on the same were inaccurate. In 
August and October 1992, a few months after the change of 
custody, the minor child, Paige, was observed and evaluated by 
Sherrie S. Reynolds, a psychologist and Dr. McManemin who 
indicated that the minor child had become more cautious, 
suspicious, socially appeared guarded, anxious, apprehensive and 
unhappy (Addendum "DM and "E"). 
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As to the stability of the plaintiff as compared to the 
defendant, the Court only parrots the statements made by Dr. 
Stewart that were, in fact, rebutted by Dr. Swaner and Dr. 
McManemin. Specifically, Dr. Stewart only spent a few hours with 
the plaintiff whereas Dr. Swaner had been in therapy with the 
plaintiff for over two years spending over thirty hours with her. 
Dr. Swaner indicated that the plaintiff was not impulsive, was 
not insensitive to the feelings of others, did not dislike men 
and, in fact, was emotionally stable (Vol. Ill, T. 12, 23). 
Further, Dr. McManemin who reviewed the MMPI raw data and notes 
of Dr. Stewart concluded that any statement that one parent was 
more emotionally stable than the other was pure speculation and 
not based on any facts that could be retrieved from either the 
notes or the testing. Dr. McManemin found that there were very 
few facts and information on the defendant and the tests and 
information were about the same for both parties (Vol. Ill, T. 
52-55). Again, Dr. Stewart's opinion was based on very limited 
information; whereas, Dr. Swaner, through two years of 
counselling, would have a better understanding and idea in 
regards to the emotional stability of the plaintiff. The 
conclusion appears to be that the Court did not carefully 
consider the evidence, but only adopted Dr. Stewart's opinions, 
and prejudice toward the plaintiff (Vol. Ill, T. 21). The Court's 
apparent reliance upon information about the stability and 
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bonding of Paige, Brandi and the plaintiff eight or nine months 
prior to the trial rather than their relationship and physical 
and emotional well-being at the time of the trial was not a 
careful consideration as to what would be in the best interest of 
Paige and only a consideration of the court's view of the 
parties. That was an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court further abused its discretion in awarding 
custody of the minor child, Paige, to the defendant since the 
evidence presented favored the plaintiff in the majority of the 
relevant factors that are stated in Moon v. Moon, (supra). 
First, and one of the important factors, is to identify the 
primary caretaker during the marriage and the parent with whom 
the child has spent most of her time. This is a prominent factor 
for determining custody. There is no dispute whatsoever that 
plaintiff was not only the primary caretaker but, in fact, since 
the parties were separated prior to the birth of the minor child 
the only caretaker because the defendant only had daytime 
visitation two days a week (Vol. I, T. 7-8). Dr. Stewart found 
that the plaintiff was the primary caretaker (Addendum wAn, p. 
11) and the Court's only rationale to offset this factor was to 
state that the plaintiff had a negative attitude toward the 
defendant and toward men and in the Court's view that would 
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outweigh the fact that the child lived entirely with the 
plaintiff during the first 18 months of her life. It seems to be 
apparent that the Court, as well as Dr. Stewart, formed some kind 
of personal bias toward the plaintiff and then made their 
findings and recommendation and ruling therefrom rather than 
having an open and unbiased attitude in reviewing all of the 
information and evidence and then coming to a conclusion in 
regards to an award of custody. 
A second factor, as stated in Moon v. Moon for 
determining what is in the best interests of the child, is the 
need for stability which was addressed in Point I of this 
argument. 
Another factor mentioned in Moon v. Moon is maintaining an 
existing primary custodial bond. Again, we have already 
previously discussed in Point I of this Argument and there is no 
question that the primary custodial bond was between the minor 
child and the plaintiff. 
Another factor mentioned in Moon v. Moon is the relative 
strength of the parental bonds. The Court concluded that the 
parental bond between the child and the two parents was equally 
strong based on Dr. Stewart. There is nowhere in the testimonies 
of witnesses or in Dr. Stewart's evaluation of any evidence to 
substantiate the bond between the minor child and the defendant. 
Dr. Stewart only observed the minor child with the defendant when 
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the child was less than a year old and still being nurtured by 
her mother (Vol. I, T. 102). However, both Dr. McManemin and the 
day care provider, Myra Brodale, observed the close bonding 
between the minor child, Paige, and her mother for the six months 
prior to the trial and, in fact, up to a week before the trial 
and testified of the strong bond between the plaintiff and the 
minor child (Vol. Ill, T. 58-59). Dr. Stewart did not do an 
update in her evaluation and had no evidence to present in 
regards to the bonding between the child and the defendant from 
the time when the child was ten months old until the child was 18 
months old. 
Another factor as stated in Moon v. Moon is the ability of 
the parent to provide care, supervision and a suitable 
environment for the child and to meet the needs of the child. 
Again, there is no question that the plaintiff provided the care 
and satisfied the needs of the child for the first 18 months of 
the child's life. Dr. Stewart indicated that the plaintiff had 
taken care of the physical needs of Paige and all of the other 
evidence presented indicated that Paige was a healthy, happy 
child and that the minor child, Brandi, after 4 1/2 years of 
being in the environment of the plaintiff was a happy, healthy, 
model child. The Court, based on Dr. Stewart's recommendation had 
to speculate in regards to whether or not the defendant would 
create a suitable environment for said child. It should be noted 
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that Dr. Stewart's opinions were based on a very limited amount 
of information and observations and none of which occurred within 
six months prior to the trial. 
The best evidence that was presented to the Court in 
regards to the environment in which Paige was involved for the 
first 18 months of her life was the testimony of Dr. McManemin 
and the day care provider, Myra Brodale, as to the emotional and 
well-being of the minor child, Brandi, who had also been in the 
same environment (Vol. II, T. 24-29 and Vol. Ill, T. 58-59). 
Based on that evidence, and not Dr. Stewart's speculation, the 
environment with the plaintiff was not only stable but extremely 
positive and emotionally rewarding for Paige. There were no 
negative characteristics in the minor child, Brandi, or in the 
minor child, Paige. However, the Court relied primarily on Dr. 
Stewartfs speculative opinion that the minor child might be 
adversely affected in the future due to the plaintiff's 
dysfunctional family history (Vol. I, T. 10, Addendum n B w ) . The 
Court adopted Dr. Stewart's reliance upon her unsupportable 
conclusion that plaintiff's alleged attitude toward the defendant 
and men was negative and exclusionary and would be passed down 
to plaintiff's child. It seems clear then that the Court's 
approach is comparable to outdated psychological reasoning that 
actual behavior and present circumstances are not as good of 
indicators as to an environment as so-called theoretical 
hypotheses and unsupported speculations. 
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The preference of the child is not really applicable since 
the child was not old enough to evaluate the custody question; 
however, Dr. Stewart's observations were based on very limited 
contact between the parties whereas the day care provider and 
the fact that the plaintiff cared for said minor child would be 
better indicators in regards to the preference of the child. It 
would seem apparent from the evidence that was presented to the 
Court that a minor child under the age of 18 months would have a 
great preference for the parent with whom said minor child had 
resided for said period of time. 
Another factor mentioned in Moon v. Moon is the benefit of 
keeping siblings together and enabling sibling bonds to perform. 
The Court and Dr. Stewart downplay this factor and stated that 
the child is too young to have bonded with the sibling, Brandi. 
However, said factor also refers to enabling sibling bonds to 
form. It is obvious from the testimony of Dr. McManemin and Dr. 
Swaner that the limited amount of visitation awarded by the Court 
would not sufficiently allow the sibling bonds between Paige and 
Brandi to continue to grow (Vol. III. T. 26); however, of more 
importance is the fact that there was already a very strong 
emotional and physical bond between said children. Dr. McManemin 
observed said bonding a week or so prior to the trial and since 
Dr. Stewart performed no evaluation of the minor child, Brandi, 
and made no update it is somewhat dubious that she would be able 
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to make any credible evaluation in regards to the strength of the 
bond between said minor children at the time of the trial. 
In regards to the desire for custody and the apparent 
commitment of the proposed custodial parent, both additional 
factors mentioned in Moon v. Moon, the Court and Dr. Stewart 
concluded that it was somewhat equal between the parties. This 
is slightly in contradiction to the evidence since the defendant 
initially would not even admit that the minor child was his and 
asked the Court to have a DNA test to determine whether or not he 
was ever the father. This is without any evidence whatsoever 
that the plaintiff had been unfaithful during the marriage (R. 
12-15). 
The factor in Moon v. Moon that the Court over 
emphasized was the character and emotional stability of the 
parties. The Court seemed to put great weight on the finding by 
Dr. Stewart that the plaintiff and plaintiff's mother had 
negative attitudes toward men. Further, it was not equitable 
that the Court put such great weight on the opinion of Dr. 
Stewart as to the psychological conditions of the two parties 
when all Dr. Stewart did was give them a couple of simple 
psychological tests and meet with them for a few hours. It is 
not likely that a very accurate analysis of a person's 
characteristics can be made with such a small amount of input 
and information. On the other hand, Dr. Swaner met with the 
plaintiff for at least over thirty hours in therapy and would be 
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better qualified and more credible in regards to giving an 
opinion in regards to the plaintiff's emotional makeup. However, 
the weight the Court gave said evidence was disproportionate and 
the weight that the Court gave the evidence in regards to the 
current physical and emotional well-being of both children at the 
time of trial was also disproportionate the other way. The proof 
is in the pudding and not in the attempt to conjecture what the 
recipe may be. Both Paige and Brandi were happy, well-adjusted 
children and that was a direct result of the psychological 
characteristics and nurturing of the plaintiff. For the Court to 
concentrate so much on one factor in regards to basing its award 
of custody was not appropriate. As is stated above, the evidence 
favored the plaintiff in the majority of the factors that the 
Court needed to consider pursuant to Moon v. Moon. 
Both Dr. Stewart and the Court seemed to be offended by 
the possibility that a woman might believe that she could raise a 
child to be a well-adjusted and emotionally happy child without 
alot of contact with the father. However, that happens every day 
since many fathers refuse to support or have contact with their 
children. The Court should have looked at the present existing 
facts at time of trial and not speculation. The important issue 
was what were Brandi and Paige like and based thereon what was 
the influence that the plaintiff was having and would have on the 
development of Paige. 
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There is no question that the Court placed greater 
emphasis on the Testimony and evaluation of Dr. Stewart than it 
did on all of the other evidence presented. This is contrary to 
the parameters set by the Appellate Court and, specifically, the 
over-emphasis of one factor in consideration of a custody award 
is an abuse of discretion. See Move v. Move, 102 Idaho 170, 627 
P.2d 799 (1981). Further, it is an abuse of discretion to have 
given greater weight to the recommendation of Dr. Stewart (See 
Standard of Review and Authorities). 
Findings of Fact cannot be based on mere speculation and 
substantial evidence has to be of such a nature, both in quality 
and quantity, that it would persuade a reasonable mind that a 
declared premise is, in fact, true (See Standard of Review and 
Authorities). Evidence offered in the report and testimony of 
Dr. Stewart are not substantial enough to support her prognosis 
that the grandmother and the plaintiff's alleged mistrust of men, 
etc. would have an adverse affect on the minor child. It is 
extremely common for a woman to mistrust a man and have negative 
feelings toward him during a divorce. It is also common for a 
woman to have negative feelings toward a father who was not 
involved that much with the woman's child. Dr. Stewart's 
prognosis as to the future was based upon such limited 
information and statements that were received by the plaintiff 
and plaintiff's mother during a period of time when they would 
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have negative attitudes toward the defendant. There was no 
testing given to the grandmother; however, the Court 
gave great weight to Dr. Stewart's analysis of what type a person 
the grandmother was. It appears to be clear that Dr. Stewart 
did not particularly care for the grandmother and the Court 
seemed to just adopt Dr. Stewart's opinions. Even though Dr. 
Stewart was concerned about the alleged problems between the 
plaintiff and her mother, Dr. Stewart never interviewed Mr. 
Evans' parents or extended family (except for a short phone call 
to his mother) to determine their effect on Paige (Vol. If T. 
117-118). 
Another fact is that Dr. Stewart stated she didn't know 
how children would turn out as far as interpersonal relationships 
are until they reached the age of 18 to 21 years (Vol. I, T. 153) 
but she was concerned about Paige, and from her limited 
information, concluded that since, in her opinion, the plaintiff 
didn't turn out very well that the same would be true of the 
minor child, Paige. It is true that the Court also would not 
know how the child would turn out being in the custody of the 
defendant and needed to make some determination as to which 
situation would be in the best interest of the minor child, but, 
the determination should be based on the present facts of the 
evidence presented to the Court and not the speculation of one of 
the expert witnesses. The Court's findings that it mostly relied 
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upon in awarding custody were based on speculation and not 
substantial evidence and should have been given lesser weight 
(R. 169-180, G, K, L and N). 
POINT III 
Section 30-3-10(2) Utah Code Annotated, specifically 
states that "an important factor to consider is which parent is 
most likely to act in the best interest of the child including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
non-custodial parent as the Court finds appropriate." The Court 
briefly alluded to defendant's contention that the plaintiff put 
unreasonable restrictions on the visitation of the defendant 
during the first 18 months of the child's life when the child 
was in the care of the plaintiff. However, the few minor 
incidents referred to by the defendant were disputed and denied 
by by the plaintiff (Vol. Ill, T. 47-48). Further, the Court 
stated that it was understandable that the parties would have 
problems concerning visitation (Vol. Ill, T. 47). Obviously, 
when two parties are fighting for custody there is going to be 
disagreements in regards to the visitation. However, there was 
never a finding by the Court that the plaintiff did not comply 
with the Order of the Court in regards to the visitation. In 
fact, pursuant to the Court Orders the defendant had almost twice 
as much visitation as that which was awarded by the Court to the 
plaintiff after the change of custody. 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Directly relating to the visitation issue is the abuse of 
discretion by the Court in limiting the visitation awarded to the 
plaintiff wherein she was denied overnight visitation with the 
minor child when the Court had the evidence before it that the 
child had been in plaintiff's exclusive custody, day and night, 
during the preceding 18 months. There is no question that the 
plaintiff had a close bond and relationship with the minor child 
and that it would have been in the child's best interest to have 
had the plaintiff still involved in the minor child's life on an 
overnight basis since that had been the situation for 
approximately 18 months. However, the Court, for some unknown 
reason, was not concerned with the best interests of the child in 
regards to disrupting the relationship that the child had with 
the plaintiff. This is another example of the reliance by the 
Court on the evaluation and recommendation of Dr. Stewart as to 
visitation rather than the Court looking at all of the evidence 
and making an independent determination in regards to what would 
be in the best interest of the minor child. It just doesn't make 
sense to limit the visitation of the plaintiff with the minor 
child to one day during the week and a couple of hours during a 
week night. This was not the same circumstance where the 
primary caretaker retained custody of the minor child and the 
visitation was awarded to the non-primary caretaker where 
overnight visitation may be disruptive. In this case the minor 
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child had spent overnight with the plaintiff for 18 months and it 
seems incredible that the Court would not determine from its own 
common sense that, in fact, it would be in the best interests of 
this minor child to allow some of that overnight visitation to 
continue with the plaintiff when the Court changed the custody. 
It is also hard to understand how the Court could believe that by 
making such a drastic change in the circumstances of the minor 
child by changing custody that it would not be traumatic for said 
child when the court limits visitation with the primary 
caretaker, the plaintiff. 
Not only did the Court abuse its discretion in regards to 
limiting the visitation but it committed error by failing to make 
adequate findings of fact to support the restrictions placed upon 
the visitation (R. 169-180). There was no finding other than the 
Court's adopting the recommendation of Dr. Stewart as to 
plaintiff's visitation. However, Dr. Stewart's recommendation 
did not specify any facts that supported her recommendation under 
the circumstances of the present case. The Court needs to enter 
sufficient findings setting forth any special or unusual 
circumstances that would justify the restricted visitation 
awarded to the plaintiff. Apparently, said visitation was 
punitive in nature since it awarded plaintiff considerably less 
visitation time with the minor child than the defendant was 
entitled to exercise during the pendency of the proceedings when, 
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in fact, the plaintiff had previously had the sole care, custody 
and control of said minor child. See Carlson v. Carlson, 584 
P.2d 864 (Utah 1978). 
Further, plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial and 
Objection to Findings of Fact (R. 186-193) and argued that the 
Court's award of minimal visitation was not only contrary to case 
law in the State of Utah but the findings as to said award were 
insufficient. In fact, there were no findings as to why 
plaintiff's visitation was so minimal. The Order of the Court 
denying plaintiff's Motion (R. 221-222) allude to various expert 
witnesses supporting said Order, but the Court's findings didn't 
mention any such thing. Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Swaner, 
did talk about overnight visitation of a small child, assuming 
that the child would be leaving the primary caretaker's 
environment, but that was not the circumstances in the present 
case. However, Dr. Swaner stated that Paige should stay with 
plaintiff and her sister, Brandi, since plaintiff had provided a 
stable home, the children were thriving and no reason to disturb 
status quo (Vol. Ill, T. 29). But the Court found Dr. Swaner's 
testimony not persuasive or credible (Addendum "B", p. 11). 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court has discretion in regards to the 
distribution of the debts; however, it is an abuse of that 
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discretion if the distribution is inequitable based upon the 
parties' financial circumstances (See Standards of Review and 
Authority). Although the Findings of Fact indicate the parties 
acquired debts and obligations and each party would be 
responsible for those in their name, there is neither a 
stipulation by the parties entered upon the record or a finding 
of the Court in regards to said debts so there is no evidence 
before the Court in regards to the debts and obligations that 
each of the parties are required to pay except for the debt to 
Dr. Stewart and the child care costs incurred by the plaintiff 
prior to the time of trial (R. 169-180). The Court found that 
the plaintiff's income was $1,456.00 and the defendant's income 
was $2,393.00 or approximately $950.00 more than the plaintiff. 
However, the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay one-half of the 
custody evaluation which is a disproportionate amount of the debt 
based upon the disparity of the incomes of the parties. Further, 
plaintiff's available income would decrease based upon the fact 
that she was ordered to pay child support and one-half of the 
daycare expenses and receive no alimony. Therefore, it appears 
to be an abuse of discretion to order her to pay a 
disproportionate amount of the only debt that was before the 
Court. Again, there is no finding by the Court in regards to why 
the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay one-half of said debt when 
there was such a disparity of income between the parties. 
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POINT V 
The Court committed error in failing to grant plaintiff a 
judgment for her day care expenses and arrearages. The Court 
specifically ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 
one-half of all day care expenses incurred during the pendency of 
the action (R. 83-86). Plaintiff testified that she had, in 
fact, incurred day care expenses for Paige and paid the same and 
that the defendant had failed to pay his one-half of said amount. 
An exhibit was received into evidence reflecting the same (Vol. 
I, T. 41, 42, 43). On cross-examination the plaintiff did not 
give conflicting evidence as the Court concluded in its ruling 
(Addendum n B n ) . Plaintiff never indicated that the day care 
costs she was requesting were for her minor child, Brandi. In 
fact, the evidence was clear that the minor child, Brandi, had 
always been with the nanny day care provider during the period of 
time that the defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff the 
day care costs for the minor child, Paige (Vol. I, T. 86-87). 
There was no basis for the Court to deny plaintiff's claim for 
reimbursement of the day care costs since the same was ordered by 
the Court, it was incurred by the plaintiff for Paige's care only 
and there was no evidence to support the Court's conclusion that 
some of the money was for the day care of the other child, 
Brandi. The Court erred since the plaintiff more than adequately 
met her burden of proof in regards to said issue. 
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SUMMARY 
The failure of the Trial Court to fully consider "the best 
interests of the minor child in determining the award of custody" 
was error and abuse of discretion where the Court failed to give 
sufficient weight to the fact that the plaintiff was the primary 
caretaker during the entire marriage and the stability and 
continuity of the custodial arrangement had been positive and 
favorable to the minor child and where the evidence supported the 
plaintiff in regards to other specific factors pertinent to 
custody decisions. The Court's award of custody was not 
consistent with the standard set by the Appellate Courts. The 
over-emphasis by the Court on the evaluation and recommendation 
of Dr. Stewart that was based mostly on speculation further 
emphasized the abuse of discretion by the Court. The Court's 
award of custody that was based primarily on its determination 
that the plaintiff would pass onto the minor child a 
dysfunctional environment was pure speculation and the Court, by 
disregarding the evidence in regards to the minor child, Brandi, 
and the effect of the alleged dysfunctional environment on her 
committed an abuse of discretion and error. Said factor should 
not have been given such great emphasis over the other factors. 
The evidence was not taken as a whole and by giving greater 
weight to the recommendation of Dr. Stewart the decision of the 
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Court to award custody to the defendant was an abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed and custody awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
The lack of findings in regards to the restricted 
visitation awarded to the plaintiff and the lack of concern by 
the Trial Court as to the effect on the minor child of said 
restricted visitation is also an abuse of discretion and said 
award of visitation should be reversed and plaintiff should be 
awarded reasonable visitation based upon the circumstances in 
this case in the event that custody is not reversed. 
The Order requiring the plaintiff to pay one-half of the 
custody evaluation is not fair and equitable and should be 
reversed and remanded to the Trial Court for a redetermination in 
regards to the allocation of said debt. 
The Courtfs denial of plaintiff's claim for reimbursement 
of the daycare expenses should be reversed and plaintiff should 
be awarded the same. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 1993. 
pStA^L.— 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Evans v. Evans 
Civil No. 904904449 DA 
Recommendations 
Custody 
Of the two natural parents, Mr. Evans is emotionally more 
stable and has a better and more realistic appreciation of the 
value of family life, both of which are important in the long 
term development of children. Mrs. Evans has developed her 
values and attitudes toward fathers and extended family from her 
own dysfunctional family structure that excluded fathers from 
contact with or participation in their children's physical and 
psychological growth. 
Other factors bearing on this recommendation include some 
that favor custodial care by Mrs. Evans, some that favor 
custodial care by Mr. Evans, and some factors that are relevant 
to the custody of older children but are not relevant to children 
in Paige's age group (1 yr./infants) 
Child Related Factors 
1. The preference of the child can only be indicated by the 
relationship between the child and the parent. Resistance to-
being held, consistent anxiousness to leave one parent for the 
arms of the other parent, whininess, refusal to make eye contact, 
or efforts to avoid being held are strong signs of the child's 
preference for the care and comfort of one parent rather than the 
other. There were no such behavioral signs of Paige*s preference 
for either Mr. or Mrs. Evans. Both parents are sought-after 
sources of comfort and attention. 
2. Keeping siblings together allows children the benefit of 
companionship, opportunities to learn, to share, care for, 
compete, or reconcile, all of which are important elements in 
socialization. Furthermore, sharing the values of one parent 
gives the children more in common as they grow than is the case 
if each child absorbs different values due to each child being 
raised by a different parent. These considerations favor Paige's 
custody with her mother. 
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3. Changing the custodial situation can be traumatic for 
children who have become accustomed to one home and who are not 
accustomed to the lifestyle and routine of care in the other 
home. However, infants and young children who leave the 
residential home for day long visits with or care by aunts, 
grandparents, and daycare providers become accustomed to being 
cared for by these people and they make a transition from one 
residential home to another quite easily. It is after a child 
begins to have a sense of belonging or ownership of his/her 
surroundings that changes are more difficult. At Paige's age 
(one year in December of 1991) ^she_can easily tLrjansfejr between 
^erj?ar^n±s^J^ both of them"are^jgmTriar^lnd ~she"Jiasr 
not^ye^^ While" 
[er^ils~preferenc^ arrangement of 
the child if the ^ child is happy and well-adjusted, there is also 
no reason to not cfiange~Tt lithe change would not in and of 
itself be traumatic and if other factors argue for such change as 
it is in this case. 
Parent-Child Related Factors 
4. The parent-child bond is equally strong for Mr. and Mrs. 
Evans. Both parents have a positive sense of obligation to and 
responsibility for Paige's nurturing and protection. Neither 
parent assumed this responsibility because of guilt or worry 
about what other people would think. Both parents regard Paige 
as their child whom they want to parent. This factor does not 
discriminate between Mr. and Mrs. Evans. 
5. The quality of Paige's present custodial situation at 
this time (Mondays and Tuesdays from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. 
every other week and Sundays and either Monday or Tuesday from 
8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on the alternate week with Mr. Evans 
and the rest of the time with Mrs. Evans is satisfactory as far 
as meeting Paige's physical needs is concerned. However, within 
a year Paige will begin to sense the ^negative and exclusionary 
jehavior and comments .regarding Mr .^Evan's, by JMrsT Eyans^anaT 
[y^5y Paige^s^gr^ cares l!or~ 
most^oTTier waging nours tKree^or^four days a week. 
( Mrs. Pack's attitude that fathers are superfluous to women who 
\ can make it on their own deprives Paige and her half sister, 
1s Brandie (and has deprived Mrs. Evans) of the opportunity to 
fy / benefit from a father's affection and guidance and the emotional 
( contributions of his extended family. No child can be happy or 
Vwell-adjusted when raised by one parent who discourages or 
l^ speciaJ 
/Paige during 
<*> 
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excludes the other parent. Paige's satisfactory adjustment at 
this time is only temporary. She will not be well-served by 
being in the custody of her mother who has an antagonistic 
attitude and whose chief comforter and source of guidance, her 
own mother, also has negative and antagonistic attitudes toward 
men as fathers. This is particularly true considering that Paige 
is also happy and well-adjusted in her fatherfs care. There is 
no reason to think that Paige will not be as happy with her 
father on a full time basis as she is now with her mother five 
days a week. If she were living with him she would have the 
opportunity to be part of her mother's and her father's extended 
families who are anxious to be part of her life. This factor 
favors Mr. Evans. 
Parent Related Factors 
6. Mr. and Mrs. Evans differ considerably in their 
qualities (personality make-up, problem-solving skills, emotional 
control, rational thinking, and empathy). Both parents are 
bright people who have adapted well to being resourceful, 
prudent, and economically and psychologically independent* 
However, Mr. Evans is emotionally more stable, sets good long-
range goals, uses rational problem-solving, and is not vulnerable 
to changing standards or goals. He is also more sensitive to and 
concerned about the feelings of other people than is Mrs. Evans. 
Mrs. Evans is capable of rational thinking but her judgment is 
flawed by her own conflicting values and competing interests 
(financial independence and personal freedom vs. social stability 
and economic conservatism) and by a serious mistrust of men as 
well as by insensitivity to other people's feelings. Lastly, her 
problem-solving is imperiled by emotional volatility, impulsive 
decisions, and by changing ideas about what is of value. She is 
primarily preoccupied with her own economic comfort and 
independence and has not practiced the art of making sacrifices 
for other people or for mutually agreed-upon goals. This factor 
favors Mr. Evans. 
7. The attitudes of parents and of their relatives toward 
the other parent tells the child what she can be proud of and how 
safe it is to love and affiliate with the other parent and that 
other parent's family. Paige is the beneficiary of her mother 
and her maternal grandmother's negative attitude toward fathers 
and their assumption that fathers are not important or necessary 
in a child's life. Mr. Evans is regarded by them as being 
inadequate in the "macho" qualities of a man, unreasonable in his 
religious beliefs, and abnormal because he voluntarily exercises 
parental responsibility for the physical care of an infant. This 
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attitude is not only unfortunate but very destructive because it 
equates responsible parenting by Mr. Evans with weakness and 
abnormal intent. Although Mr. Evans feels that he can provide 
better parenting for Paige than can Mrs. Evans, he has not formed 
an attitude toward her that denigrates her as a person or arouses 
suspicion about her "normalcy". His criticism are specific: 1) 
her emotional ^ol^tilr^^ creates insecurity in 
her life and mayenH^mger^ affect their welfare; 
and 2) her emphasis on having enough money to satisfy her desires 
is a poor standard for family relationships and establishing 
values in life. He accepted her "partying" past and declaration 
of intent to change to a different lifestyle and he did not 
engage in labeling or name-calling that calls into question her 
character. In this respect Mrs. Evans1 attitude toward Mr. Evans 
is very harmful and his toward her is not harmful. This factor 
favors Mr. Evans. 
8. Mr. and Mrs. Evans1 emotional stability reflects long-
standing personality traits and ways of adjusting to challenges. 
They are not merely situation-related, temporary states in either 
parent. Their attitudes, values, and behavior patterns have been 
consistent over the years and are likely to continue in the 
future. Mr. Evans1 attitudes, values and behavior patterns are 
far more likely to produce a stable home life and positive 
emotional and social development than are Mrs. Evans1 attitudes, 
values, and behavior patterns which have led to impulsive 
behavior, indecision, and difficulty in selecting and maintaining 
mutually satisfying interpersonal relationships. This factor 
favors Mr. Evans. 
9. Both parents are sincerely motivated to carry out 
parental responsibilities and are equipped to do so on a 
practical basis. Neither parent is seeking custody for economic 
gain or to hurt or humiliate the other parent. Both parents 
could meet the physical and economic requirements of parenting. 
However, Mr. Evans has the ability to meet the emotional needs of 
growing children because he is emotionally more stable and has a 
tradition of family interaction. X This factor alone does not 
differentiate the parents significantly enough to weigh heavily 
in custody. 
10. Surrogate care will be required by both parents and it 
has been provided by Mrs. Evans1 mother, Mrs. Pack, three or four 
days a week so far. % Mrs. Pack's care meets Paige's physical 
needs but will be inadequate and harmful emotionally as Paige 
matures and is exposed to the distorted family values (or lack of 
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and father. ^Mrs. Pack?s destructive attitude figures as a 
negative factor for Mrs. Evans. 
11. Of the function-related factors, Mrs. Evans and her 
mother have been Paige's primary caretakers except for two days 
per week when Mr. Evans takes care of Paige during the daytime. 
The role of primary caretaker was defined by Mrs. Evans who did 
not want to live with Mr. Evans and who arranged for her mother 
to provide care for Paige during the day. Paige has spent most 
of her time since her birth a year ago (and during the pendency 
of this divorce proceeding) with her mother because Mrs. Evans 
made that arrangement when she elected to dissolve the marriage a 
few weeks after Paige was conceived. However, Mr. Evans has 
performed all of the daily functions for care of Paige on two 
days per week and was limited only by Mrs. Evans, not by his own 
motivation. This factor does not differentiate significantly. 
12. Neither parent can be flexible in adapting work to 
child care. Mrs. Evans1 job is an 8:30 to 5:00 job five days a 
week and Mr. Evans works approximately from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 
p.m. on Thursday through Friday, allowing him three days off from 
work. 
13. The stability of Mr. Evans1 environment is superior to 
that of Mrs. Evans and favors Mr. Evans. £i\)haA-facte) 
Tallying the factors that favor each parent is less 
significant than the fact that Paige was conceived because of 
impulsive decisions, poorly thought out values, and strongly 
conflicting needs that produced a great deal of pain and anxiety. 
While strongly attached to and protective of her children, Mrs. 
*7 Evans f
 <J:ifestyle^ emotional volatility, and dysfunctional family 
relationsHIps^put Paige's development in considerable jeopardy. 
Mrs. Evans has accepted the dysfunctional quality of her family 
relationships but Paige should not be subjected to a third 
generation of such emotional conflicts. 
Visitation 
Mrs. Evans should have visitation every Saturday from noon 
until 6:00 p.m. and every Wednesday from 6:00 until 8:00 p.m. 
Paige will spend Martin Luther King Day in January with her 
mother and will spend Presidents Day in February with her father. 
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Paige will spend Memorial Day with her father. 
Paige will spend July 4th with her mother when it does not 
fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. She will spend July 4th 
with her father when it does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend July 24th with her mother when it does not 
fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday and she will spend July 24th 
with her father when it does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend Labor Day with her father. 
Paige will spend Thanksgiving Day on odd-numbered years with 
her mother from 1:00 until 6:00 p.m. and shall spend even-
numbered years with her Father. 
Paige will have a visit with her mother on Christmas Eve Day 
from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. On Christmas Day she will have a 
visit with her mother from noon until 4:00 p.m. When Paige is 
of school age she will have an additional visit with her mother 
three school days during the school holiday if her mother is off 
work and is at home with her on those days. 
Paige will have a one week visit with her mother when she is 
age four in the summer if her mother is off work. When she is 
five years old she can spend two weeks with her mother. 
Paige will visit her mother on Mother's Day from noon until 
6:00 p.m. if she is not otherwise with her. 
Paige will spend from 6:00 until 8:00 p.m. with her mother 
on her mother's birthday. Paige will also have a visit with her 
mother and half sister, Brandie, on Brandie's birthday or at such 
time as it is celebrated. 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
EBS:nr 
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TORI K 
ROBERT 
. EVANS, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v s . ) 
L. EVANS, ) 
^Defendant, ) 
Case No- 90 490 4 4 49DA 
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT 
OF JUDGE'S RULING 
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THE HONORABLE J . DENNIS FREDERICK 
June 2 , 1 9 9 2 
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GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
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S a l t Lake C i t y , Utafc 8 4111 
5 3 1 - 7 4 4 4 
RANDY S . LUDLOW 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
311 S o u t h S t a t e S t o e t , S u i t e 2 8 0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta* 8 4111 
5 3 1 - 1 3 0 0 
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
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THE COURT: The p a r t i e s and t h e i r c o u n s e l are 
p r e s e n t . 
Having taken t h i s m a t t e r under advisement , f u r t h e r 
5 I c o n s i d e r e d the e x h i b i t s r e c e i v e d , the tes t imony e l i c i t e d , 
6 I I am prepared t o r u l e a t t h i s t i m e . 
7 I In t h i s mat t er the p l a i n t i f f Tori Evans, now known as 
8 | Woods, seeks" a d i v o r c e from the defendant on the grounds 
9 I of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n the i n s t a n t m a t t e r , t h a t 
10 i s , t h i s case number D - 9 0 - 4 4 4 9 , f i l e d on November the 5th of 
11 1990. 
12 In case number D-91-2 5 f i l e d on January the 30 th of 
13 1991, the p l a i n t i f f i n t h a t a c t i o n , Robert Evans , s e e k s the 
14 same r e l i e f . 
15 The two a c t i o n s were c o n s o l i d a t e d by order of t h i s 
16 Court on the 8th of February of 1991 . The Complain i n the 
17 l a t e r a c t i o n f i l e d i s t r e a t e d h e r e i n as a C o u n t e r c l a i m . 
18 The e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t both p a r t i e s are 
19 e n t i t l e d t o a d i v o r c e on the grounds - of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
20 I d i f f e r e n c e s and e a c h i s granted the same. 
21 I The p a r t i e s have s t i p u l a t e d on t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e income £ 
22 f o r purposes of support pursuant t o the Uniform C h i l d 
23 Support G u i d e l i n e s s e t f o r t h in E x h i b i t 6, the w o r k s h e e t . 
24 A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e y have agreed t h a t no alimony s h o u l d be 
25 awarded, t h a t the defendant i s t o mainta in h e a l t h and a c c i d e n t 
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i n s u r a n c e on the c h i l d P a i g e , t h a t the p a r t i e s a r e t o sha re 
e q u a l l y t h e c o s t of a l l m e d i c a l , d e n t a l e x p e n s e s n o t cove red 
by i n s u r a n c e , t h a t the p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y as c u r r e n t l y 
d i v i d e d i s t o be awarded t o t he r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s , and t h e s e 
s t i p u l a t i o n s a r e a c c e p t e d by t h i s C o u r t . 
The p a r t i e s r e s e r v e d f o r t r i a l the payment of Dr . 
S t e w a r t ' s f e e s wh ich were i n i t i a l l y p a i d by the d e f e n d a n t . 
Th is C o u r t fiow o r d e r s the p l a i n t i f f t o r e i m b u r s e the 
d e f e n d a n t f o r o n e - h a l f of s a i d c o s t s p r o f f e r e d a t t h e sum of 
$ 3 , 0 0 0 . Judgment i s awarded i n b e h a l f of the d e f e n d a n t 
a g a i n s t t he p l a i n t i f f in the amount of $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s the d e f e n d a n t owes 
h e r f o r c e r t a i n c h i l d c a r e e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by p a y m e n t s t o 
he r m o t h e r s e t f o r t h i n E x h i b i t 3 . The e v i d e n c e i s 
c o n f l i c t i n g a s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s e sums, $ 1 , 1 0 0 , were 
p a i d f o r P a i g e ' s c a r e o n l y . The p l a i n t i f f , i n t h i s C o u r t ' s 
v iew, h a s f a i l e d i n h e r b u r d e n of c o n v i n c i n g t h i s C o u r t 
t h a t t h i s was the c a s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h a t c l a i m i s d e n i e d 
The o v e r r i d i n g i s s u e i n b o t h d i v o r c e a c t i o n s i s the 
20 I c l a i m f o r c u s t o d y of P a i g e , t he p a r t i e s ' minor d a u g h t e r , 
21 | whose d a t e of b i r t h i s December t h e 18th of 1990 . The 
2 2
 l p a r t i e s , by s t i p u l a t i o n of June t he 2 1 s t of 1 9 9 1 , a g r e e d t o 
23 I have an i n d e p e n d e n t c u s t o d y e v a l u a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o Rule 
2 4
 I 4-903 of t h e Code of J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o be c o n d u c t e d 
25 | by E l i z a b e t h S t e w a r t , PhD. p s y c h o l o g i s t , which was a c c o m p l i s h e d 
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1 | and the report filed on January the 1-th of 1992 and 
2 I received as Exhibit 8. 
3 I This is a close case. Neither parent here is a 
4 I "bad" parent. Both have many commendable attributes, but 
5 unfortunately, i t falls upon this Court to decide the 
6 custody issue, and I must decide that issue in accord 
7 with what I deem to be the best interests of the minor 
*^8 child Paige ^ho is , after a l l , my primary concern. 
9 Dr. Stewart testified that in preparation of her 
10 report, she conducted interviews with the defendant, with the 
n defendant's mother, with the plaintiff, some five different 
12 times, with the plaintiff 's mother, with the plaintiff 's 
13 father, the pediatrician of the child Dr. Thomas, the day 
14 care provider, the plaintiff 's stepmother. She observed 
15 Paige in the presence of both parents. She observed 
16 Paige with her stepsister Brandie. She performed diagnostic 
17 evaluation tests including the MM PI, the Rotter sentence 
18 completion test , custody questionnaire, and these activities 
19 were performed over a course of two to three months, a 
20 p e r i o d from O c t o b e r of ' 9 1 t o and i n c l u d i n g December of ' 9 1 . 
21 Dr. Stewart's recommendations are challenged by Dr. 
22 Swaner, p l a i n t i f f ' s p s y c h o t h e r a p i s t f o r two y e a r s , who, by 
23 h e r own. a d m i s s i o n , h a s n ' t o b s e r v e d t he c h i l d i n r e l a t i o n 
24 to either parent, made no third-party contacts, only saw the 
25 defendant twice, and is unaware of the requirements of 
4 J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 I Rule 4-903, Code of Judic ia l Administrat ion, and has done 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 ! 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
no custody eva lua t ions since 1988. 
Dr. McManemin likewise challenges Dr. S tewar t ' s 
recommendations, yet by her testimony has had no contac t 
with the defendant, made no t h i r d - p a r t y con tac t s , 
observed no paren ta l i n t e r ac t ion with the ch i ld , and only 
did an eva lua t ion of Brandie for approximately two and 
one-half hours about two weeks ago. 
Exper t s , of course, d isagree in th i s case . This 
Court, t he r e fo re , must conclude which recommendations are 
more s a t i s f a c t o r y , convicing and persuasive. In decid ing 
custody cases between competing pa ren t s , t h i s Court must 
consider a number of fac tors which are set fo r th in 
Rule 4-903, Code of Jud ic ia l Administration, and those 
factors are as fol lows, i n t e r a l i a , the preference of the 
chi ld , the benef i t of the s i b l i n g s remaining toge the r , 
the s t r eng th of the c h i l d ' s bond to the respect ive p a r e n t s , 
the benef i t s and/or disadvantages of continuing the present 
custody arrangement, the moral and/or emotional s t a b i l i t y 
of the p a r e n t s , the duration of the desire for custody, 
the necess i ty of surrogate care for the ch i ld , the presence 
or lack thereof of substance abuse or use, i l l i c i t substance 
abuse or u se , whether custody was rel inquished in the past 
by e i t h e r of the pa ren t s , the religious compatabil i ty with 
the ch i ld , the kinship r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the c h i l d , and the 
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1 I financial ability of the parents to support the child 
2 | and themselves, and any other factors coaidered important 
3 I which, in this Court's view, Dr. StewartSas done in her 
4
 extensive report and testimony. The oths? experts have not. 
5 Pursuant to Tile 30-3-10 and follaring of the Utah 
6 Code Annotated as interpreted by case la^ most notably 
7 in the case of Moon versus Moon found at 790 P. 2d. 52, a 
8 1990 case, this Court must consider, in feciding what is 
9 in the best interests of the child, in afiition to those 
10 factors set forth in Rule 4-903, additioml elements. 
11 This Court has done so and finds as follais, and not 
12 necessarily in the order delineated in t i Moon case. 
13 The parent bond between the child and the two parents 
H here is equally strong. Both parties ha* a positive 
15 sense of responsibility to Paige 's nurturing and protection. 
16 The quality of Paige's present custodialarrangement, even 
17 though Paige has been, since February of 1992, after Dr. 
18
 Stewart's report was issued, been place din day care rather 
19 than in the care of the plaint iff 's motharv this arrangement, 
20 in this Court's view, is problematic. 
21 The plaint iff ' s attitude toward t i defendant, which 
2 2
 is unduly influenced by her mother, is nsgative and 
23 exclusionary. Her unreasonable restrictions on visitation 
24 is one example of her antagonism toward 3fe relationship 
2 5
 of Paige to her father. 
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These f a c t o r s , convincingly expressed by Dr. Stewart 
in both her repor t and her test imony, in th i s Cour t ' s view, 
outweigh the circumstance of the chi ld having been in the 
temporary custody of her mother during ths pendency of 
these proceedings. The emotional s t a b i l i t y and the 
character of the defendant, in t h i s Court's view, i s superior 
to that of the p l a i n t i f f . 
While both parents are resourceful , economically and 
psychological ly independent, the defendant i s emotionally 
more s t a b l e . He has a b e t t e r , more r e a l i s t i c apprec ia t ion 
of the value of family l i f e and i s more l ikely to produce a 
stable home environment with pos i t ive social and emotional 
development on behalf of the ch i ld Paige. He s e t s , as Dr. 
Stewart has convincingly t e s t i f i e d , long-ranqe goc-.ls, 
i s r a t i o n a l in h i s approach to problems, and not vulnerable 
to change in s tandards . He i s l e s s impulsive and more 
sensi t ive to the concerns of other people. 
P l a i n t i f f , on the other hand, the evidence has 
e s t ab l i shed , has evidenced emot iona l -vo la t i l i t y and an 
-xnsens i t iv i ty to the fee l ings of o thers . &he i s pr imar i ly 
concerned with her own economic comfort. Her judgment i s 
flawed, as has been t e s t i f i e d to convincingly by Dr. Stewart, 
by con f l i c t i ng values . She se r ious ly mistrusts men* Her 
problem-solving i s imperiled by emotional v o l a t i l i t y , and she 
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The preference of the child, according to the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart, seems to be more or less equal. 
That testimony is jDensuasive. to this Court^ 
The element of keeping the siblings together, of 
course, is a serious issue and that, of course, argues in 
favor of continued custody with the plaintiff. Yet, 
the plaintiff chose from March of 1991 to February of 1992 
to, in large part, rear the children apart, Brandie in day 
cars and Paige with her grandmother. 
At this stage I am persya4ed, according to the 
testimony that ' s been received, -the child does not share an 
interest or comfort and care for the other child, Brandie, 
that is , at this early stage of development,- T am persuaded 
that the long-term bonding issue has not yet arisen to the 
point where i t would cre_ate undue t-rauma for a transfer. 
The claim of the plaintiff and her mother that the 
defendant is unreasonable in his religious beliefs and is 
abnormal because he wants to exercise parental responsibility 
19 I for the physical care of the child is not borne out by the 
20 j e v i d e n c e . M o r e o v e r , t h i s a t t i t u d e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c r e d i b l e 
an^ p e r s u a s i v e t e s t i m o n y of O r . S t e w a r t i s d e s t r u c t i v e t o 
22 I the child's development. 
23 The d e f e n d a n t ' s v iews of t h e p l a i n t i f f a r e more 
24 j s p e c i f i c and r a t i o n a l . Hs d o e s n o t convey h i s n e g a t i v e 
f e e l i n g s t o w a r d the p l a i n t i f f t o t he c h i l d , and p l a i n t i f f and 25 
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1 | the plaintiff 's mother, as they have in tfe past to Brandie , 
2 | they will, in a l l likelihood, result in tk same sorts of 
3 [negative feelings being developed in Paige^ -
4 ' The plaintiff has evidenced emoticaal instability in 
5 certain particulars that have been borne Kit by the evidence, 
6 For instance, dating the defendant before she was divorced, 
7 seeking to move the marriage up in terms af time, having 
8 experimented in the past with i l l i c i t substances, to-wit, 
g I cocaine , having abused alcohol in her prise marriage , 
10 [having had an i l l i c i t sexual liason, havij^ abnormal 
H reliance on her mother, having concluded itaost immediately 
12 her need to terminate the marriage , and barring the 
13 defendant from the child's bir th; moreover, not consulting 
14 the defendant with regard to flaming of ths child and not 
15 even advising him of the child 's birth until four days after 
16 i t occurred. 
17 Moreover, i t is my view, and I'm persuaded the 
18 evidence supports that view, that she holfe the belief that 
19 one parent, the mother, should raise the diild, the father 
20 shou ld l e a v e them a l o n e , and t h i s i s brouifit f o r t h i n 
21 Exhibit 7, her handwritten l e t t e r , 
22 Surrogate care is , of course, re girted, no matter 
23 which p a r e n t r e c e i v e s c u s t o d y y b u t g i v e n tjr d e f e n d a n t ' s 
24 work schedule and anticipated work schedule-it is more 
25 f l e x i b l e t h a n t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s , w h i c h would r e s u i t i n l e s s 
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surrogate care for the chi ld than i f the p l a i n t i f f had 
custody. 
The defendant has e s t a b l i s h e d his a b i l i t y to provide 
for* the day-to-day cars of Paige during his considerable 
v i s i t a t i o n arrangements, and I am persuaded t h a t , based 
on his testimony as wel l as that of Dr. Stewart and o thers , 
that he i s p e r f e c t l y capable and able to care for t h i s 
minor c h i l d . 
Changing the cus tod ia l arrangements can c e r t a i n l y be 
traumatic, and I am c e r t a i n l y ' aware of that problem. 
However, I be l ieve that the persuasive evidence her has 
e s tab l i shed that in Paige's c a s e , being now 18 months o ld , 
shs can mak* the t r a n s i t i o n from one household t o the other 
without th» t y p i c a l attendant trauma. Shs has not v e t 
developed a sense of belonging or ownership to one parent 
as opposed to the other . Indeed, most of her l i f e she has 
been cared for^by surrogates , her grandmother and then day 
care and has moved, made the t r a n s i t i o n from the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
to the defendant 's home without convincing evidence of 
trauma during v i s i t a t i o n e x e r c i s e d . 
The defendant has compatible re l ig ious va lues with 
the ch i ld and a more stable extended family than the 
p l a i n t i f f . 
This Court i s persuaded that Paige's best i n t e r e s t s 
would be served by the transfer of the primary care to the 
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defendant* fia i s the more e m o t i o n a l l y s t a b l e and dependable 
of these two p a r t i e s . 
The p l a i n t i f f ' s l i f e s t y l e , her emot iona l v o l a t i l i t y 
a n d * d y s f u n c t i o n a l f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s put P a i g e ' s d e v e l o p -
ment in j e o p a r d y . 
T h i s Court adopts the recommendations of Dr. Stewart 
as be ing r e a s o n a b l e , c r e d i b l e and persuas ive and f i n d s , on 
the cortraryY the t e s t i m o n y of Doctors Swaner and McManemin 
not t o be s o p e r s u a s i v e and c r e d i b l e . 
P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the v i s i t a t i o n a t a minimum s e t 
f o r t h as recommendations c o n t a i n e d in Dr. S t e w a r t ' s r e p o r t , 
E x h i b i t 8 , e x c e p t i n g tha t r a t h e r than a ha l f day on e a c h 
Saturday, the p l a i n t i f f s h a l l be awarded one f u l l day e a c h 
Saturday from 9 a.m. t o 6 p .m. In a l l o ther p a r t i c u l a r s 
a t t h i s time the v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e recommended by Dr. 
Stewart i s adopted by t h i s C o u r t . 
The p h y s i c a l t r a n s f e r of the c h i l d i s t o take p l a c e 
Tuesday, t h a t b e i n g tomorrow, a t a time tha t i s c o n v e n i e n t 
t o the p a r t i e s . I would a n t i c i p a t e , ' g i v e n the work s c h e d u l e 
20 I of the p a r t i e s and I have no knowledge as t o what t h a t 
21 would b e , t h a t sometime in the morning would be the 
22 appropr ia t e time t o a c t u a l l y t r a n s f e r the p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y 
23 of the c h i l d , and I w i l l se t a time of ten o ' c l o c k a . m . , 
24 u n l e s s the p a r t i e s are able t o agree o t h e r w i s e . 
25 The de fendant i s awarded c h i l d support p u r s u a n t t o the 
11 
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Uniform C h i l d Support G u i d e l i n e s , based ipsn the income of 
the p a r t i e s r e f l e c t e d in E x h i b i t 6. 
Each p a r t y i s t o bear t h e i r own at torney's f e e s . 
Mr. Ludlow, you prepare the Findings of F a c t , 
Conc lus ions of Law and Decree , submit tho» t o Ms. C h r i s t i a n 
for approval as t o form. 
MR. LUDLOW: I w i l l do s o , s i r . 
THE COURT: Are there any ques t ions , c o u n s e l ? 
MR. LUDLOW: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very w e l l . " Court w i l l be i n r e c e s s . 
(Whereupon, the p r o c e e d i n g s were o c c l u d e d . ) 
* * * 
12 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
) ss 
) 
I , ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby c e r t £ y : 
That I am a C e r t i f i e d Shorthand Reporter, L i cense No. 
220 , and one of the o f f i c i a l c o u r t reporters of the s t a t e of 
Utah; t h a t on the 1 s t day of J u n e , 1992, I a t t e n d e d the 
w i t h i n matter- and r e p o r t e d i n shorthand tie p r o c e e d i n g s had 
t h e r e a t ; t h a t l a t e r I caused my s a i d shorihand p r o c e e d i n g s 
t o be t r a n s c r i b e d i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g , and ti* f o r e g o i n g 
p a g e s , numbered from 2 t o 12 , i n c l u s i v e , c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l , 
|true and c o r r e c t account of the Judge ' s Ruling, t o the b e s t 
of my a b i l i t y . 
DATED a t S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s 2nd day of June, 
1992. 
ANNA M. BENNHT, CSR 
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ELIZABETH B. STEWART, Ph.D. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
DIPLOMATS CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
SUITE 900 VALLEY TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
(801)363-6644 
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Evans v. Evans 
Civil No. 904904449DA 
Observations of Paige Evans 
Paige will be one year old in December of 1991. She is a 
very alert, responsive, and good-natured child. According to 
both parents and her pediatrician she is passing developmental 
milestones of early infancy in a normal fashion. She is very 
affectionate and responsive to people and is quite outgoing. 
Paige presents no problems in parenting to either her mother 
or her father. Her good nature, quick learning, and delight in 
being with other people make her an easy child to handle. 
At the present time Mrs. Evans complains that Paige is over 
fed by Mr. Evans and that she does not sleep through the night 
after visits with him. However, it is more likely that these 
problems are related to the tension between Mr. and Mrs. Evans 
rather than to Paige's being with her father per se. Problems of 
this sort are never reported by parents who are living together 
and they typically are related to the separation, divorce and 
attitudes of the parents rather than to the actual relationships 
between parent and child. 
Paige would adjust to being in the custody of either parent. 
.iz^beth 13. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
EBS:nr 
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ALTA VIEW CENTER FOR COUNSELING 
A DIVISION OF WASATCH CANYONS HOSPITAL 
9690 South 1300 East, Suite 220, Sandy, Utah 84094, (801)572-5001 
October 22, 1992 
RE: Paige Evans 
Age: 21 months 
To Whom It May Concern: 
At the request of Tori Woods, I am writing to verify the fact that 
I evaluated her daughter, Paige, on 10/1/92 and 10/17/92 for 
emotional and behavioral problems. 
Paige has very limited visiting privileges with her mother and it 
appears to have taken its toll. Clinical observations and informal 
- play therapy revealed a child more cautious and suspicious than 
would be expected of a child Paige's age. She appears to have 
reached developmental milestones appropriately, but socially she 
appeared guarded, suspicious, and anxious. Her interactions with 
mother and sister were warm and loving. She felt secure and 
comfortable in their presence. 
My concern is the minimal time Paige is allowed to spend with her 
mother. Children benefit from having a positive experience with 
both parents in their lives. Young girls have a better prognosis 
when they can experience positive role modelling from an 
appropriate mother figure. My clinical judgment is that Paige and 
her mother need more time with each other. Page is fortunate that 
both of her parents express and exhibit deep love and concern for 
her. I support a re-examination of Paige's custody and visitation 
arrangements to facilitate optimal development of attachment and 
bonding with both parents. 
If you need further information from me, feel free to contact me at 
(801) 572-5001. 
Cheri S. Reynolds, Ph.D. 
Psychologist 
mn 
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>72-5083 
August 13, 1992 
To Whom It May Concern, 
After having met with Paige Woods several times, it was 
striking to note the difference in her behavior and appearance. 
Two months ago Paige was a happy, outgoing girl with lively affect, 
who made outreach quite easily and occupied herself well. She held 
good eye contact and smiled frequently. When I saw her recently 
on August 8, 1992 after not having seen her for several weeks her 
behavior and appearance had changed significantly. She was clingy 
with her mother, had a scowl on her face most of the time, 
displayed a short attention span and low frustration tolerance and 
did not accept outreach from anybody but her mother, let alone 
approach anybody else. Furthermore, Paige avoided eye contact and 
became apprehensive at the sound of the slightest noise outside, 
suggesting a serous decrease in her general level of comfort and 
equilibrium. 
These are warning signals that Paige is not adjusting well to 
her new schedule and environment and should be further 
investigated. 
If you have further questions or need more information, 
please, contact me at 272-5083. 
I hope that this is helpful to you. 
Sincere! 
Johanna F. McManemin, Ph.D. 
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